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Introduction
As users transact across virtual spaces within ubiquitous environments via their portable mobile smart devices like handhelds, PDAs, iPhones etc., the consumer business model has now moved to a setting where human consumers potentially purchase goods or services anywhere as long as they have access to their personal smart devices. The purchasing and subsequent downloading of songs (e.g. from iTunes), movies, music videos, etc is now so simple and inexpensive that users inadvertently involve themselves in such digital transactions as a matter taken for granted. And so, we have the situation where numerous amounts of digital content are bought and sold within this environment. Naturally, security issues arise that need to be addressed properly and trustworthily.
When a digital content is sold to a buyer B, there is a need to protect the seller's rights against cases where the buyer illegally redistributes copies of this content. Therefore, watermarking protocols are typically used to embed buyer-specific watermarks (a.k.a. fingerprints) into the content so that when an illegal copy is found, the extracted watermark reveals who the guilty buyer is.
However, it was not until [22] that the issue of protecting the buyer was raised. This is now known as the customer's rights problem. Briefly, this is caused by the implicit assumption that sellers are fully trusted, but if a seller is malicious, he can easily embed any buyer's fingerprint into his content and frame an innocent buyer for illegal distribution.
Building on this idea, [18] proposed the first of what is now a class of buyerseller watermarking (BSW) protocols [18] , [14] , [1] , [9] , [16] , [25] based on privacy homomorphic encryption schemes and watermarking schemes with linear embedding functions, though the more recent two [16] , [25] protocols have the explicit design strategy such that they no longer require underlying watermarking schemes with the linearity property. Interestingly however, it is the absence of this property that is the starting point for our attack to work, as will be described in our Section III on protocol analysis.
In particular, we show in this paper that for a recent variant of the buyer-seller watermarking protocols, namely [25] , it is possible for the buyer to remove his fingerprint from his copy of the bought content. This therefore directly disproves the piracy tracing property claimed by the protocol. In fact, since piracy tracing is one of the earliest security applications of watermarking protocols, it raises doubts as to the soundness of the design of this protocol.
Buyer-Seller Watermarking Protocols
These are protocols that provide content distribution between a buyer and a seller, in which the buyer of the content can be traced, while at the same time the seller cannot frame an honest buyer of illegal content redistribution. In addition, a malicious buyer cannot deny illegally redistributing content.
As mentioned earlier, BSW protocols were first proposed by [22] and later improved by [18] . [14] presented a protocol that also protects the buyer's privacy. Several buyer-seller protocol variants have been constructed since then, including the protocols proposed in [1] , [2] , [5] , [6] , [8] , [9] , [12] , [13] , [15] , [16] , [17] , [21] , and subsequent analyses appear in [10] , [11] , [20] , [24] , [5, 4, 23] .
Parties Involved
A buyer-seller watermarking protocol involves a seller (S), who provides (or sells) content to a buyer (B), while an arbiter (A) settles disputes between the seller and buyer. A special trusted third party may also be involved. In many buyer-seller watermarking protocols [18, 14, 16] , this role is played by a watermark certification authority (WCA), who is responsible for generating and certifying client watermarks. It is assumed that the seller and the buyer do not trust each other. It is also assumed that W CA and A will not conspire with the seller and/or the buyer.
Threats
The main security threats for BSW protocols can be classified from the perspective of which is the malicious party:
-Seller. A seller may frame a buyer. This happens when a seller inserts a unique watermark matching the buyer's identity into copies of the content and distributes this widely. Later the seller can accuse the buyer of illegal content redistribution by extracting this watermark from these copies. -Buyer. There are two main threats:
-A buyer may try to remove the watermark in the marked content.
-A buyer may redistribute copies of content given by the seller, and later deny this fact when confronted by the seller.
Security Properties
These motivate the three main security properties of a buyer-seller watermarking protocol [14, 16] :
-Traceability. The identity of a legitimate, but dishonest, buyer who illegally redistributes content can be traced by the seller. This is the fundamental property expected of watermarking protocols used for copyright protection. -Framing Resistance. An honest buyer cannot be falsely accused of illegal redistribution by the seller. This property relates to the customer's rights problem which motivated the introduction of BSW protocols.
-Non-repudiation of Redistribution. A dishonest buyer who has redistributed illegal copies of content cannot refute this fact. This allows the seller to prove the illegal act of the buyer to a third party arbiter. In this case framing resistance is a prerequisite since, without this property, a buyer can claim that it was the seller who redistributed copies of the content.
Some existing protocols [14, 16] include the protection of buyer's privacy as an additional security property, but in this paper we will only focus on the three fundamental properties.
Main Techniques
To fulfill the above mentioned security properties, the main idea is to prevent the seller from being able to determine the final marked copy given to the buyer while still allowing the seller to trace the identity of the buyer in illegally redistributed contents.
-For piracy tracing (traceability), BSW protocols deploy digital watermarking schemes [3] . -For non-repudiation of redistribution, BSW protocols deploy digital signature schemes such as RSA-OAEP to ensure that a dishonest client cannot repudiate the fact that copies of content were illegally distributed. -To prevent the seller from framing a buyer (framing-resistance), most BSW protocols deploy asymmetric homomorphic encryption schemes such as Paillier [19] together with digital watermarking schemes such as the spread spectrum watermarking scheme [3] in a way that the party (i.e. the seller) who embeds his share of the watermark into the content has no idea what the final embedded watermark is. This technique is termed as watermarking in the encrypted domain [7] . As for who should generate the buyer watermark, there are two different techniques: -In the first technique introduced by Memon and Wong [18] , a special trusted third party commonly known as the Watermark Certification Authority (W CA) was introduced to generate buyer watermarks, instead of letting the distributor to generate them; the WCA is fully trusted. -In the second technique, which was deployed by [25] , the buyers are tasked to generate their own watermarks.
The Zhang et al. and Lei et al. Protocols
The [25] protocol basically inherits all the properties of its immediate predecessor the [16] protocol, but in addition its design strategy is such that there are only two parties involved, namely the buyer and the seller, and they do not need to interact with any TTP (W CA in this case) during the buying-selling stage except if a dispute arises later. The aim of this strategy is to eliminate the threat of conspiracy attacks [1, 9, 25] . Indeed, it is a major achievement to design a secure buyer-seller watermarking protocol that does not require a TTP. Both BSW protocols comprise three subprotocols; namely, the registration subprotocol, the watermarking subprotocol and the identification and arbitration subprotocol. However, only the registration subprotocol and the watermarking subprotocol, which are relevant to the discussion in this paper are described. Note that the registration subprotocol for both BSW protocols are identical. For compactness of description, the Zhang et al. watermarking subprotocol and Lei et al. watermarking subprotocol are illustrated in Fig. 2 and Fig. 1 , respectively. The notations used are as defined in Table  1 . 
The Registration Subprotocol
The buyer, B firstly applies to CA for an anonymous certificate 1 as follows: [X ] to the buyer and stores all the necessary information in her database with respect to X. 6. Finally, the buyers receives his watermarked purchased content X by decrypting the message received from the seller with his sk * B .
1 An anonymous certificate is just like a normal digital certificate except that the subject field contains a pseudonym but not the user's identity. Fig. 2 . Again, by using homomorphic public key cryptosystem, the seller can insert the second-round watermark W into X in the encrypted domain to obtain E pk * B (X ). Then, S delivers E pk * B (X ) to B and stores the sales record for X. 4. Finally, with the knowledge of sk * B , B can decrypt the received E pk * B (X ) to obtain the final watermarked content X .
The Zhang et al. Watermarking Subprotocol
For more details of both protocols, we refer the reader to [16, 25] .
Attacking the Zhang et al. Protocol
It was claimed by [25] in their Section 4 that in their protocol, a buyer, B is unable to remove his fingerprint W from the copy X he had purchased. Hence, traceability (i.e. piracy tracing) was claimed. To be precise, the argument is that since X = X + W = X + V + W , therefore since both X and V are unknown to B and further that only one share (out of two) of W is known to B, therefore B is not able to extract any information on W . In general, one can only remove an embedded watermark W if one knows the value of W . Nevertheless, we show here that this can be circumvented for the Zhang et al. protocol, i.e. a buyer can remove his fingerprint hence invalidating the piracy tracing claim; and thus a dishonest buyer can then illegally redistribute the bought content. The problem stems from the fact that both secret shares SEC B and SEC S are embedded into the encrypted domain of X independently, and in the same way that any individual independent watermark, e.g. V is embedded, thus X = X + W = X + V + W = X + V + SEC S + SEC B can be viewed as having been embedded with 3 independent watermarks V , SEC S and SEC B . To the best of our knowledge, no other BSW protocol exhibits this. Therefore, with the knowledge of the value of any of these 3 watermarks, that watermark can be removed. In the case of B, he knows SEC B , therefore he can remove SEC B from X before illegally distributing it, thus all traces of B can no longer be found in the pirated copy.
In more detail, recall that a robust watermarking scheme is needed for the watermark embedding and extraction, the most common one being [3] used by all BSW variants to perform watermark embedding and extraction. This was also the one used by Zhang et al. as a concrete example in their Section 3.
The scheme first performs DCT on the content to obtain a set of DCT coefficients, which we denote as x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m . Then a scaled version (let α be the scale factor) of the watermark is added to the DCT coefficients based on three possible variants of an insertion formula in [3] . For ease of description, we use the simplest one but we stress that our attack applies regardless of which is used. Let W = w 1 , w 2 , . . . , wm, then insertion of watermark W into the DCT coefficients x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m of some content X is:
where x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m are the watermarked coefficients. In the case of the Zhang et al. protocol, the coefficients of X are:
Therefore, B can remove traces of SEC B from X by doing:
Note that the same problem fundamentally exists in Zhang et al.'s immediate predecessor [16] . Interestingly enough, this problem is a consequence of the design strategy of not requiring the underlying watermarking scheme to be linear in contrast to most existing buyer-seller protocol variants [18, 14, 1, 9] . By design, this relaxation relates to not including a secret permutation σ applied on W , thereby the underlying watermarking scheme need not be linear. Indeed, if the Zhang et al. protocol was designed with such a σ applied more specifically on SEC B prior to insertion, then it seems this attack can be prevented. Yet, it was the non-requirement of linear underlying watermarking schemes (thus non-inclusion of σ) that was the explicit design strategy of these two protocols in the first place. What is intriguing is that the use of this would have protected the Zhang et al. protocol from our attack in Section III. In contrast, for the Lei et al. protocol it is possible to resist our attack even without the secret random permutation because there is an option (stated en passant by Lei et al. in [16] ) to not have the entire X sent but only a profile describing it. If this option is enforced, our attack will not apply.
The main problem why the Zhang et al. protocol falls to our attack is that while the Lei et al. protocol keeps B's watermark unknown to him, in contrast the Zhang et al. protocol allows B to choose the part of the watermark, i.e. SEC B that uniquely binds B to a content. The other part of the watermark, i.e. SEC S does not do so. To summarise, it does not matter how many parts are used to form the embedded watermark W , nor that not all parts are known to B. What matters is that the parts that bind B to the content must be unknown to B.
Conclusion
It is a nice idea to use secret sharing to solve both the problem of seller's and buyer's rights by distributing the secret shares of the watermark between both parties. However, if the embedding operation and the operator used to combine the shares are commutative, and further if the part of the watermark that binds B to the content is known to B, then it leads to our attack described above.
We do not see any way to fix the Zhang et al. protocol to still provide piracy tracing without eliminating its simplicity and basic structure. We remark that this is yet another example where an "improved" variant i.e. [25] is insecure while the predecessor i.e. [16] is not.
